Presented by Martin Ottenheimer
Central States Anthropological Society Meetings
Cultural relativism is the principle that an individual human's beliefs and activities should be interpreted in terms of his or her own culture. – Wikopedia 2007
‘Culture’ has been one of the most important concepts developed in the modern study of human behavior. However, it has yet to be used in a successful scientific understanding of the human condition. One reason is that it has simply been treated as a secondary factor of human behavior, an epiphenomenon based upon a biological “human nature.” In kinship, for example, marriage patterns were considered to be cultural elaborations upon a more fundamental bisexual reproductive process. Not until the end of the century did a growing number of anthropologists decry this formulation as an ethnocentric bias. They argued that this secondary status of culture did not represent a realistic depiction of the human condition and gave culture a much more fundamental role in understanding human behavior.
The revolt against the primacy of bio-evolutionary explanations of human behavior has led to a sharp division in anthropology. On the one hand, cultural relativists give culture the premiere role in the study of the human condition with symbolic behavior playing a more important role than physical factors in understanding social behavior. Furthermore, interpretation and not scientific explanation is considered the major goal of research. In contrast, are the anthropologists who maintain the priority of biological factors; view social life based primarily upon bio-evolutionary factors, and consider science the only proper research tool.
I consider this division between culture and interpretation, on the one hand, and biology and science on the other, unproductive and unnecessary. The nurture/nature debate now dominating much of anthropological discourse needs to be put to rest and we need to learn how to deal with the integrated character of human behavior and how interpretation and science can be combined. Nurture and nature are interwoven factors of the human condition and it is not necessary to consider one as more basic or fundamental than the other. The goal to develop a better understanding of human behavior can not be attained unless we join both cultural and biological analyses in a scientific enterprise. To do this, we need to recognize the shortcomings of both sides in the current debate and develop a new approach.
Two important changes must be made to attain a significant new approach to the study of human behavior. The first is to discard the notion of particularism found in cultural relativism. By only accepting the values of the culture of a group being analyzed we deny ourselves the ability to make valid cross-cultural comparisons and to develop any meaningful scientific statements. The second is to move beyond the tenets of traditional science and utilize the underlying conceptual tools of modern scientific research. This includes recognizing that modern scientific research is relativistic. Traditional science, with its concepts of naïve realism and the objective observer, denies one of the most important contributions of modern anthropology; viz., that people, including scientists, use culture to define reality. In contrast to the traditional science that still forms much a part of the anthropological debate, modern science deals with reality as an intimate relationship between the observer and the observed, symbol and object, interpretation and physical conditions. It is my intention to show how modern relativity can become a productive paradigm for the anthropological analysis of human behavior.
Modern relativity is a powerful analytical tool that has provided scientists with significant insights into the physical world at both the cosmic and atomic level. It has also led to highly productive technological developments which dramatically have changed our way of life. Social scientists have for some time entertained the idea that relativity could also be applied to the world of human social behavior. However, no acceptable relativistic approach has yet emerged. Cultural relativism, furthermore, has actually hampered the development of such an approach. Originally prescribed as an antidote to the arrogance of ethnocentrism, the methodology of cultural relativism has proven to be an example in which the prescription is as deadly as the disease.
‘Cultural relativism’ is used today in different ways. The cultural relativism I am talking about today is the one that denies an objective, absolute standard for analyzing or evaluating human activity and asks that ideas and behavior be examined by reference to the culture in which they appear. At first glance, it appears to be relativistic. Its name is an obvious allusion to relativistic frameworks and, it appears to be a viable alternative to the absolutistic claim that there exists an objective standard for the study of human behavior. Furthermore, it does not assume the physical world provides an objective, absolute standard for evaluation. Cultural relativism also recognizes that a scientific framework is an ethnocentric expression arising out of the cultural environment of the scientist. “Objective facts” are, in cultural relativism, symbolic expressions resulting from a filtering of “reality” by the tools and worldview of the observer. It is these features that give it the appearance of a relativistic approach.
But cultural relativism goes on beyond these assumptions about the world and its relationship to an observer and asks the investigator of human behavior to not use the premises, values, etc. from one’s own culture to describe or analyze other cultures. The evaluation of other cultures from the purview of so-called objective standards is denigrated in cultural relativism as ethnocentrism. To avoid ethnocentrism, cultural relativism calls for the evaluation and description of cultures in their own terms. This analytical procedure, whereby a frame of reference derived from the culture of the observed is to be utilized for describing, analyzing, and evaluating human social behavior is the essential characteristic of the cultural relativism commonly found in anthropological discourse and which is of primary concern here.
By rejecting the presumption of an objective investigator, by denying the existence of an absolute frame of reference, and by asking a culture to be judged relative to its own values, culture relativism appears to be relativistic. But, as a number of anthropologists have pointed out, this is not the case. Referring to the method of cultural relativism as “absolute relativism”, “extreme relativism”, “epistemological relativism”, “particularism”, or “localcentrism” (Feinberg 2001, Latour 1993; Ottenheimer 2001, 2003; Sousa 2003) critics have recognized that cultural relativism is not an alternative to absolutistic frameworks. They point out that cultural relativism, like other absolutistic approaches, utilizes a privileged reference frame for examining, describing, analyzing, and evaluating human behavior. A truly relativistic approach, in contrast, has no privileged reference frame.
As I have pointed out elsewhere (Ottenheimer 2001), Schneider (1984) provides a good example of the failure of cultural relativism to meet the basic criterion for relativistic analysis. He criticized the use of “natural” biological processes of reproduction in traditional kinship analyses for being ethnocentric constructions. Their claim to being facts providing an objective frame of reference for analyzing all of human social behavior was attacked by Schneider for being merely western cultural artifacts inappropriate for examining social life in other cultures. He, furthermore, contended that kinship, as a construct based upon these ethnocentric notions, existed only in the minds of anthropologists. This criticism has been widely acclaimed and influential in a number of areas of social research resulting in many investigations of symbolic interaction that is part of human behavior. What has gone generally unrecognized, however, is that the method of cultural relativism Schneider offered as an alternative to the approach using a privileged framework based upon western biological notions of natural reproductive processes also uses a privileged frame of reference. The difference is that, instead of the ethnocentric framework of the observer, the ethnocentric framework of the people under investigation provides the privileged frame of reference. (see Bates 1996:8, Miller 1999:12, Harris and Johnson 2000:11, Ferraro 2001: 12, Haviland 2002:51, for examples) This reference frame is derived from the meanings, values, and standards of the culture under study. Thus, it should be apparent that the bio-absolutism Schneider eschewed and the cultural relativism he applauded share an essential aspect.
There are basically two methodological differences between the bio-absolute approach and the cultural relativistic one suggested by Schneider for kinship analysis. There is (1) a shift in the location of the frame of reference and (2) a restriction in the range of behavior of the domain of analysis. In the absolutistic formulation, an analytical frame of reference from the observer’s culture is used for the entire range of human cultures. Cultural relativism utilizes the subject’s cultural frame of reference and restricts it to the culture of the observed. The important point here is that they both use a privileged frame of reference for the observation, description, and analysis of human behavior. Neither is relativistic. Thus, cultural relativism fails to provide a real alternative in social science to an approach based upon absolutistic assumptions.
I recognize that cultural relativism has played an important part in the history of anthropological theory. Its concerns with ethnocentrism and the recognition of the significance of symbolic culture for human behavior are particularly noteworthy. These are important steps towards a relativistic analysis. But, it has fallen short. It utilizes privileged frames of reference. Not only does this make it not relativistic, it also does not provide a viable alternative to a bio-absolutistic approach. It is flawed and highly vulnerable to criticism. This is a problem especially since the criticisms of cultural relativism have been mistakenly taken to be valid for relativistic approaches. This has hampered the consideration and development of relativity in the study of human behavior.
In the scientific community, cultural relativism has been criticized because it does not permit scientific generalizations. This is a fair criticism (see Ottenheimer 2001) but it has been incorrectly assumed that these generalizations can only come from an absolute framework. The argument usually states that a basis for valid cross-cultural comparisons can only come from the “biological facts of nature”. For example, Fox, Gellner, Goodenough, Holy, and Scheffler have argued that objectivity supported by a “real” (physical or material as opposed to ideational) foundation is necessary to produce proper generalizations.
Cultural relativism has also come under criticism in regard to ethical issues. “What if people practice slavery, torture, or genocide?” asked Ember and Ember (2002:19). Must the anthropologist simply accept these practices and not judge them as vile or try to eliminate them? Not accepting this response, the Embers’ propose a “weaker form” of cultural relativism. In this weaker form, the anthropologist is to strive for objectivity and, at the same time, be tolerant (p. 19). In other words, one is to deny a positive value for a disturbing cultural trait on the basis of some “objective” standard. This “weaker” kind of cultural relativism is also nothing but a form of absolutistic approach. To avoid placing negative value judgments upon unpleasant or unwanted behavior, it calls for an objective standard. It is what cultural relativism tried to avoid. Essentially, critics of cultural relativism have absolutistic positions based upon naïve realism. They fail to recognize the significant insights provided by the development of the concept of culture in the analysis of human behavior.
Philosophers have dismissed cultural relativism by arguing that it is self contradictory. In a form of word play, one first declares that cultural relativism is the belief that all beliefs are equally valid. If all points of view are true, it is then argued, the assertion that relativism is false must also be true. Consequently, there is a contradiction. The conclusion is then taken to be that the second assertion is true and the relativist’s contention that all beliefs are equally valid is false. A second version argues that the assertion, “All truth is relative,” is an absolute statement that, if true, contradicts itself. Consequently, not all truths are relative and the statement is false.
Philosophical critiques often make the error of confusing relativistic approaches with cultural relativism. Then, by refuting cultural relativism, they assume that relativistic approaches are inadequate. Philosophers uncomfortable with relativity may find it easy to refute cultural relativism, but its shortcomings do not imply that relativistic approaches are inadequate, inconsistent, incorrect, or inappropriate.
It should be noted that the philosophical critiques of cultural relativism often rest upon a form of traditional logic. In this form of logic, the narrow, absolutistic assumption is made that when there are two contradictory statements, if one is true the other must be false. This traditional logic is not appropriate in a modern, relativistic approach. In traditional logic, if there are two contradictory statements, there are three possibilities: the first one is true and the other is false, the second one is true and the first one is false, or both are false. With relativity, when statements made from distinct frames of reference are contradictory, there are four logical possibilities involved: the three of traditional logic plus the one that both statements are true. The philosophical arguments against relativity are based upon the classical and restricted view of contradictory statements. They actually presume what they supposedly deduce. Arguing that “everything is relative” is self-contradictory does not imply that it is false when relativistic frames of reference are considered. The statement that “A is greater than B” may be true from a particular frame of reference while the contradictory statement, “A is not greater than B”, may also be true. It is possible, for example, for the distance an object travels to measure differently from different frames of reference. Then, both statements that the distance is greater than X and less than X can be true. This is the case in the example below.
Relativity has been used successfully for centuries in classical physics. To provide an example, think of a boat moving parallel to a shore when the ship’s captain fires a bullet from a gun at the stern of the vessel to a target at the bow of the boat. Now, suppose one of the seamen onboard the vessel measures the distance the bullet traveled and finds that it is equal to the length of the vessel. At the same time, a scientist on shore also measures the distance the bullet traveled but does so by reference to the shore. Comparing their measurements afterwards, the scientist and seaman discover that they do not agree. The distance traveled by the bullet measured by the seaman is equal to the length of the vessel while the scientist’s measurement reveals that the bullet traveled further than the length of the vessel. The assertion that the lengths are the same and the assertion that the lengths are different are contradictory. From the traditional non-relativistic view, if one is true, the other must be false. The assumption of an absolute reality, furthermore, misleads one to believe that an observer will find that one is false by taking precise and accurate measurements.
With an overall view of the situation and by comparing the measurements taken on board the ship with the measurements taken in reference to the shore, one can easily see that the contradictory statements made by the scientist and the seaman may both be true. For the seaman, measurements relative to the ship revealed that the distance the bullet traveled was the same as the length of the boat. But, for the scientist on shore the measured distances relative to the shore revealed that the bullet traveled further than the length of the ship since the distance the bullet traveled was the combined distance of the length of the ship PLUS the distance the ship traveled during the time the bullet passed from the stern to the bow. Thus, relative to the ship, the statement that the distances are the same is true while, relative to the shore, the statement that the distances are different is also true. There is no need to assert that only one of these measurements represents the “real” distance. Nor is there the need to denigrate the scientist for being ethnocentric and insist that anytime a measurement of an action on board the boat should be taken by someone on the boat. We can accept both measurements as legitimate by recognizing that they both produce valid results in terms of two distinct reference frames. Furthermore, we should expect results from the two measurements to produce productive information. The aim should not be to try to reject one or the other but, instead, to learn how to use both. This requires being able to analyze situations without a privileged reference frame.
The absence of a privileged reference frame is the essence of a relativistic approach. It is this feature that distinguishes relativistic from absolutistic approaches. Cultural relativism has a privileged reference frame and is NOT relativistic. It does, however, differentiate itself from other non-relativistic approaches. Cultural relativism tries to take into account the impact of symbolic culture upon human behavior. In so doing, it has taken a major step towards a relativistic framework for the social sciences. Recognizing that culture is an essential part of the human condition and that it mediates any interaction between the observer and the observed, cultural relativism has pointed anthropology in the direction it must travel. It takes the first step towards a significant new method of analysis that breaks free from traditional science.
In the traditional science of the 17th century, scientific research meant an objective observer measuring an external, clockwork universe. It also supposed the researcher could find structures existing independently of the observer. Furthermore, in physics, absolute time provided a framework for scientific measurement and analysis that was independent of the motion of the observer. Since the time of Newton, however, there have been significant changes in the scientific method. Today, most physical scientists no longer see time as a separate and absolute framework for measurements. They have successfully adopted a relativistic paradigm to the world of space travel and atomic energy. But, in spite of the enormous successes applying this paradigm to the physical world, relativistic analyses have rarely been applied to the understanding of the human condition. There is, I believe, an enormous potential offered by relativistic analysis for understanding human social behavior.
In the book-length manuscript under preparation, Relativity and Culture, I detail one way anthropological analysis can productively combine the modern concept of relativity with the concept of culture. Today, I simply want to point out that cultural relativism, where we are asked to analyze human behavior with a privileged reference frame, fails to do this. While it does recognize the significance of symbolic culture and denies the existence of an objective observer, it fails to go beyond particular characterizations and permit valid generalizations necessary to any science. To recognize the importance of culture, reject the idea of objectivity, and still have scientific generalizations in the analysis of human social behavior, it is necessary to go beyond cultural relativism. I am not a cultural relativist because cultural relativism does not provide a real, productive alternative to bio-absolutism in anthropology. It is not relativistic.