"Front and Rear in Future War," from "Front i tyl v voine budushchego," Na novykh putiakh, 1925, as reprinted in M. V. Frunze, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Moscow, 1940)

Translation copyright David R. Stone 2006

The basic and most important conclusion from the experience of the past imperialist war of 1914-1918 is the reevaluation of the question of the role and significance of the rear in the general course of military operations.

The position that "the outcome of war will be decided not only directly on the battlefront, but on those lines where the civilian strength of the country stands" has now become a common axiom. The experience of war showed that achieving a war's aims in contemporary conditions has become a significantly more complicated matter than previously. Contemporary armies have colossal endurance [zhivuchest']. This endurance is wholly connected with the general state of the country. Even the complete defeat of an enemy army, achieved at a particular moment, will still not bring final victory, in so far as the defeated units have behind them an economically and morally strong rear. Given time and space, providing for the new mobilization of human and material resources necessary for reestablishing an army's combat readiness, the defeated army can easily recreate a front and carry on the struggle with hope for success.

From the other side, the difficulty of providing for an army's mobilization preparedness has risen to improbable levels. The measures necessary for this are measured not in hundreds of millions but billions of rubles. No budget, understandably, is capable of matching these figures, even in the richest country.

Finally, the rapid progress of contemporary military technology acts in the same way. What is recognized as most advanced today will tomorrow already be obsolete and incapable of bringing victory. From this--the inadvisability and direct danger of colossal financial outlays on the preparation of mobilization stockpiles. The center of gravity has moved to the corresponding organization of industry and in general to the country's management.

From this we can conclude the necessity of reexamining the very principles of strategy. In a clash of first-rank opponents, a decision cannot be reached with the first blow. War will take on the character of a lengthy and harsh contest (69), testing all economic and political resources of the warring sides. Expressed in the language of strategy, this signifies a shift from the strategy of decisive, lightning blows to a strategy of attrition.

This conclusion, while basically correct, must be supplemented by a correction coming from the class character of future war.

The essence of this correction is that under a deep intensification of class contradiction, the moral stability of one of the warring sides may turn out to be quite weak and may not withstand the active of the first serious military blow. Especially characteristic on this point is the position of warring sides of opposed class structures--e.g., the clash of any bourgeois state with our Soviet Union. It is obvious that as result of a strong military blow from our side, the hands of a spontaneous class-proletarian movement in the opposing side could be untied, the seizure of power by the working class could become possible, which would signify an immediate end to the war.

Doubtlessly, this kind of discussion is applicable to us as well, in so far as internal enemies of worker-peasant rule can rear their heads. This is explained, moreover, by the fact that the remnants of the armed White Guards (Wrangelites) and others continue to this day to enjoy the well-known patronage of the governments of bourgeois countries.

Thus, from the discussion above, there is no need for us to conclude that we need to absolutely reject a strategy of lighting blows (this strategy, by the way, in not rejected in bourgeois states either). On the contrary, the stronger the class contradictions in enemy states, the greater the chances and grounds for success and profit of just this strategy. Despite all this, the need to prepare for a long and difficult war is still obligatory for us. Insofar as we're discussion the class of two different worlds, this means the fight will be to the death. The worker-peasant Republic has many enemies, and therefore the struggle will under any conditions be a long one.

Therefore, the connection of the front with the rear in our day must become much closer, more direct, and more decisive. The life and work of the front at every moment is determined by the work and state of the rear. And in this sense the center of gravity of conducting war moves from the front backwards--to the rear.

There is still another point in this direction, connected with the development of military technology and the perfection of destructive forces. The transformation of aviation into a decisive branch, the improvements in chemical weapons, the possible use of infectious agents, and so on, and so on--all (71) this essentially overturns the very concepts of "front" and "rear" in the old meaning of the terms.

"Front" in the sense of a region directly encompassing military actions has lost its previous character as a living barrier blocking enemy access to the "rear." If not completely, then in any event at least in part (depending mainly on the size of the territory of a given country), the rear has now blended with the front. From this there must be new missions and new methods of preparing the country's defense and, in particular, a new role for the rear itself as a direct participant in the struggle. If the direct weight of conducting a war falls on the entire nation, the entire country, if the rear is acquiring such significance for the general course of military operations, then naturally the task of preparing it comprehensively and systematically in peacetime take top priority.

This preparation must have as its first goal the uninterrupted supply to the front of everything necessary for the conduct of military operations; second, the supply to the rear of everything necessary to maintain its working energy and moral stability at the necessary level. The task is understood in that way in all contemporary world powers, straining to give it practical expression.

For us, this problem--the problem of organizing the Soviet state for the eventuality of war--has exceptional significance. The size of our territory, the comparatively low population density, the insufficient railroad net, the weak development of industry, general technical backwardness, and so on--all this puts us in an extremely disadvantageous position in terms of mobilization preparation by comparison with potential enemies.

Our standing army must be the means providing for the planned conduct of the country's mobilization. But no one in our Union can be under illusions on this score. We have gone to extremes in our efforts to reduce the military burden on the population. In 1924 we cut the army by an additional 50,000 troops, and so instead of our previous 610,000 we now have only 560,000 men. And since a significant number of these are in the rear services, in all kinds of supporting positions, the share of actual combat elements in the army remains a much smaller figure. In such a situation it's clear that we do not have a standing army in the true sense of the word: a sufficient armed force in being and ready to accept the blows of the enemy. We have only a cadre, only the skeleton of a future army, and even that is insufficiently strong.

From that, our urgent, burning, immediate task: to strengthen (71) general efforts at preparing the country for defense; to organize the country in peacetime so that it can quickly, easily, and painlessly move to military rails. The path to this lies in taking a firm course to the militarization even in peacetime of the functions of our entire civil apparatus. What this must mean, we will now see.

The task of preparing the country for defense in contemporary conditions lies far outside the current capabilities of the army and the military bureaucracy alone. The task must become the concern of the entire country, the entire Soviet apparatus. The matter may seem impossible at first glance. That's not true. The difficulties here, it is true, are very great, but in fact the character of our state power will make overcoming them easier than for all others.

Here are some examples to indicate the direction in which our work must now go.

Preparation of the officer [commander] corps. To date this has been the exclusive responsibility of the military. A whole network of military-educational institutions of all types for all specialties and ranks already exists for this purpose. Is this system satisfactory? Hardly. First, it is extremely expensive. Second, those being prepared for the needs of war (the reserve officer corps) are nevertheless insufficient.

Can this task be handled differently? Doubtlessly, it can. A living example of this can be found in America, where the preparation of reserve officers lies entirely within Comrade Lunacharskii's responsibility [People's Commissar of Enlightenment / Education]. We can look at a description in the journal _War and Peace_ [White emigre journal], where we read:

"The method of producing reserve officers from among the youth of institutions of higher education has achieved a high degree of development in America as a result of the system's democratic nature and low expense. At the present time, 123 institutions of higher education in the United States carry out the military training of student volunteers, who constitute the 'student body of reserve officers,' numbering as many as 60,000 people.

"The military preparation itself in the university is structured so that it brings the students benefits: relaxation, physical and sport training, calling forth competition and interest. As a result, passing through a military course is regarded as a special reward and is accompanied by clear- benefits (prizes, material assistance, and so on). Finally, the study of military science is set up in a model and interesting manner. Distribution among specialties is carried out in correspondence with the specialization of the university or department (72): for example, students of the mechanical engineering department are prepared for service in shore artillery and so on. Each university or college is put into a specific number of groups by branch of service or specialty in correspondence with the department's specialty and its number of students. All the groups together make up the 'military department' of the educational institution. An officer heads the department as a professor of military science, having under his command teachers of military science, as was as line officers and junior officers.

"The rector of the university assigns a certain number of hours in the week for study of a course in military science and allocates the necessary facilities for holding the courses' material elements (artillery pieces, tractors, rifles, and so on) belonging to the military department"

All the general activities of the Commissariat of National Enlightenment must be structured so that they complete account for and serve the needs of defense. Its militarization is necessary at all levels and branches.

It's possible that some part of the personnel of the educational establishment may be frightened by this "militarism." This only shows the presence of sentimental, petty-bourgeoisie moods and a complete misunderstanding of the essence and character of the tasks facing our Republic's workers and peasants. The deep and principled contradiction existing between the nature of the Soviet Union and the remaining bourgeois-capitalist world must sooner or later take the form of a open and decisive clash. The facts of contemporary international life are a sharp demonstration of this. One cannot say with certainty that the result of the new anti-Soviet bloc now being organized by England will become a new intervention in the near future. But one can and must with all decisiveness underline that in general such a clash is unavoidable. Theinitiative to attack will not be ours. As far as concerns us, we could calmly await the results of our cultural and economic successes. Sooner or later, this would inevitably lead to the flowering of socialist ideals in other countries as well. But our enemies would hardly allow us the possibility of peaceful socialist development, which threatens the very existence of capitalism. And therefore our task--to firmly, methodically, and unwaveringly prepare for this struggle, to prepare the conditions of our victory.

Organizing and directing the Commissariats of Enlightenment of the union republics is among the most important of these types of conditions. As a result of this work, the army must receive cultured, literate, and politically-educated soldier-citizens. When this is achieved, it will nine-tenths decide the outcome of any threatening clash. Each success in this direction at present endlessly benefits our work in wartime itself. Liquidating illiteracy in this draft contingent must be this coming year's concrete task. Up until now the army has had to deal with this issue, which has done great damage to other priorities. It can and must be dealt with by the Commissariat of Enlightenment before the moment of call-up.

A different immediate task must be the inclusion in primary and secondary schools programs of a minimal course in military knowledge and training. This is especially important in the countryside, providing the overwhelming majority of the of armed forces. At the present time, thanks to its low cultural level and at times simple illiteracy, this contingent does not present the best material for the conditions of contemporary battle. These shortcomings must be addressed by corresponding changes in education, beginning with the school bench. The role of our teachers in this is immeasurable. With a small addition of resources, they can provide colossal services to the defense of the country.

Another example--transport [oboz]. The demand for transport in a mobilized army will be enormous. To think of preparing mobilization stockpiles on the military budget alone is the purest illusion, for its resources are insufficient to satisfy even day-to-day necessities. And the very system of accumulating these mobilization reserves is extremely impractical in view of its expense. But the needs of mobilization could be completely satisfied if our economic organs were, in place of the impossible task of creating such reserves, to address themselves instead to the development and distribution among the peasantry of vehicles of such types which would both completely satisfy the economic demands of the population and at the same time be suitable for military needs. The introduction of a system of supportive measures and broad backing for this, starting with the army, would ensure success.

Another example. We've begun to develop a tractor industry. As is well-known, the tractor will play an important role on future battlefields. In addition to the obvious role of tanks, the caterpillar tractor has broad application in other spheres of military affairs: for example, in a series of countries the transition for horse-drawn to tractor-drawn artillery is beginning. Given our poverty, thinking about the accumulation of that technology in peacetime exclusively for the needs of the army would be a fool's game. But to ensure that the types of tractors applied to peacetime ends would also satisfy certain minimal military demands--that's a completely necessary and practicable measure.

Means of communication and transport will play an especially important role in the course of military activities. In essence, all the mobilization-preparatory work in this area lies outside the sphere of the military. To provide the wartime army with mobilization reserves of communications equipment and transport at the expense of the civilian budget is a utopia, and a harmful one. All this must be prepared in the process of the normal, peacetime work of the corresponding People's Commissariats. This work has already received the necessary attention. We can already see some results, especially in communication. In a whole series of forms of production, we've already freed ourselves from foreign dependence. We need to move still more energetically and broadly on this path. We need to organizationally establish and strengthen a still closer link between the relevant People's Commissariats and the corresponding sections and directorates of the military. The latter must become the mobilization-instructional staff for the former.

Such "militarization" is fully achievable, but only under two necessary conditions: first, under a clear consciousness by the rear, and especially the civilian apparat, of its role in future war and necessity of timely preparation for it. Second, under the establishment of a vital, direct connection between the military and the civilian apparat. This connection must be strengthened organizationally, through the introduction of representatives of the army to corresponding civil organs and institutions relevant to their specialties.

Our economic managers will have an especially important role. They must remember that war requires the mobilization of all the country's economic resources, agricultural, industrial, and financial. These must be organized, coordinated, and directed by the same strategy that directs the operation of the armed forces.

The leaders of our trusts and conglomerates [kombinaty], the directors of our plants and factories, in all their peacetime activities must start from these points-of-view. With each new undertaking--economic, cultural or otherwise--they must always ask the question: what's the relation between this project and the need to provide for the country's defense? Isn't it possible, without damage to peacetime demands, to do things that provide for the achievement of certain military goals?

From the other side, our military managers must review the types of items supplied to both the peacetime and wartime armies. We need to strive to the maximal use of those models which are objects of broad consumption in peacetime, if possible, where mass production is already instituted. Here all non-essential details must be ignored. The possibility of mass supply in wartime without any additional exertion or outlay fully excuses any secondary defects. (75)

Understandably, we cannot demand from our managers such preparation, such knowledge of military affairs, which would automatically produce the fulfillment of these demands. To help them is above all the task of the military. The military is obliged, with the help of certain organizational forms of the work of the apparat, and also the agency of various social organizations (Society of Friends of the Air Fleet, Dobrokhim, VNO, and others) to influence the character and direction of the work of economic organs.

Finally, the question of the mobilization of industry and in general of the country's economy. Experience of the imperialist war gives us rich material in this regard. Our civil war, in its turn, provided a series of valuable data, flowing from the particular structures of our state. I must complain that our experience here is little studied in the corresponding post-war literature. The work of our supply organs--Chusosnabarm and oprodkomarms--has the greatest practical interest in addition to great historical significance.

The particular importance of systematic, planned, and painstaking investigation and preparation on the question of industrial mobilization is clear to all. Meanwhile we must recognize that we have done extremely little on this. This work must be set up just as it is in general staffs with regard to purely military questions. The same operational plan that we draw up for troops we must assemble for the deployment of our national economy in wartime. This plan must take into account all our demands and all our resources. The proper and uninterrupted supply of the front and rear must be provided for. This work is incredibly complex, but it is necessary and possible. It's worth noting that carrying this out is far easier for us thanks to the state character of the basic branches of our industry. This is our great superiority to bourgeois states, and it would be unforgivable to not know how to use this advantage in the proper way.

Scholarly works that shed light on the development of these important themes are almost entirely absent, but this must not continue. It's worth wishing that research on these questions would occupy a fitting place in our military and civil press. This is, above all, the duty of our supply officials. I would like to remind them again and again to more quickly and radically abandon the remains of views which have sunken into oblivion. The task of our supply officials is not merely to distribute production among various units: it would be far simpler if it were only distribution. The center of gravity of their work is in state procurement orders [zagatovka]. State orders are located in the hands of civil and state organs. To take all this into military hands simply and directly is a utopia. (76) It is necessary to approach the issue somewhat differently, to not only be in on how they do things "there" [in the civil sector?] but to influence the character of production itself, proceeding from the demands of defense. Given this, supply must not just concern itself with providing for the army's current needs, but to no less a degree concern itself with mobilization stockpiles. But in order to do this we must realize very well the truth--that the center of our attention must be transferred to the organization of corresponding branches of industry. Our supplying directorates must have as their primary task the provision of an original mutual link with the entire industrial world of the country, and equally with the scientific-technical world. This connection must not be limited to central organs--it must take place at the local level as well. An exceptionally important role will then fall on our territorial units. They must, above all, not wait for prodding from above, but strongly connect themselves with the local apparat, stubbornly carrying through the line indicated from above.

Any productive work is conceivable only in the presence of corresponding organization, habits, skills, and methods. Work on such a grand scale, a systematic sketch of which I gave above, demands this to an even greater degree. We are not especially rich in good organizers. The entire practice of our work is threatened by thousands of kinds of shortcomings. Many of them are not the result of not understanding, but simple disorder, slovenliness, and the absence of a systematic approach. Bringing about the program sketched above is made much easier by the state character of the basic elements of our economy. It would be a scandalous crime if given such an advantage we were unable to elevate the defense of the Soviet Union to the necessary heights. We need only good will on the part of civil and military officials, and then, planned, systematic, stubborn work.

Only with such an approach will the mobilization of the country for the needs of defense be set up as it should.

The significance of the rear, that is the preparation of the entire economic and state apparat of the country, presents a serious challenge to the personnel of civil institutions--in the sense of accounting for the demands of future war and harmonizing production with its needs--and to military personnel in establishing the closest ties with corresponding civil institutions. Together with this, the exceptionally important role of the rear does not in any way diminish, but on the contrary in many ways increase the requirements and concerns of the cadres of the standing army.

The problem of indoctrination and education of millions of reserves with uninterrupted difficulties in military affairs and a comparatively short term of service, the problem of the best organization of troops under current technological conditions and our real technological possibilities; the task of daily verification and unwavering improvementof the basis of military affairs from the point of view of future mass war; finally, the establishment in the Red Army of a firm tone of precise, systematic, and unstinting work down to the smallest screw--all these tasks must be carried out by nothing less than the entire Red Army, in order that future mobilization will give the possibility of providing with the least exertion of energy for the creation of strong and organized army of war.

That's why the permanent personnel of the Red Army--above all, of course, the officer, political, and administrative-managerial corps, bear an especially great responsibility. Each unit of the Red Army now existing has in the event of war a sufficiently significant multiplier which, when put into action, will many times over increase its strengths and its weaknesses. The leadership of the Red Army must take this into account and work sincerely, work creatively, for from their work in a very, very significant measure depends our victory, the victory of the international proletariat in the looming clash with capital.